



The Formation of Statehood Among the Kalmyks in the Volga Region in the XVII-Early XVIII Centuries

La formación del Estado entre los kalmyks en la región del Volga en los siglos XVII y principios del XVIII

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Abstract

The aim of the work is to analyze the historical events that led to the formation of statehood among the Kalmyks. For that, the history of the formation of statehood among the Kalmyks in the Volga region in the XVIIth and early XVIIIth centuries is examined. Many historian researchers have addressed this topic, but nevertheless, many issues of the history of Kalmyk statehood remain controversial. Since the topic of the formation of the Kalmyk statehood has its own understatements and hitherto unexplored areas, the need for its full disclosure is still relevant. In the process of research, different scientific methods were used: The method of diachronic analysis, the method of historical periodization, mental modeling, and also the retrospective method. The policy of the Kalmyk Taishi with the Russian state was a means of achieving stability within the Kalmyk society, an accelerator of the formation of Kalmyk statehood in the Volga region. The research concludes that among the many reasons for the migration of Kalmyks to the Volga region, one can single out the main one: the fact that the Kalmyks felt the need for territorial space to create their sovereign state.

Keywords: Kalmyk Khanate, Russian state, Kalmyk statehood, political sovereignty, Shert Treaty.

Resumen

Analizaremos los eventos históricos que llevaron a la formación del Estado entre los kalmyks. Para ello, examinamos la historia de la formación del Estado entre los kalmyks en la región del Volga en los siglos XVII y principios del XVIII. Muchos historiadores han abordado el tema, pero varios temas de la historia del Estado de Kalmyk siguen siendo controvertidos. Dado que el tema de la formación del Estado de Kalmyk tiene sus propias subestimaciones y áreas hasta ahora inexploradas, la necesidad de su divulgación completa sigue siendo relevante. En el proceso de investigación se utilizaron diferentes métodos científicos: el método de análisis diacrónico, de periodización histórica, el modelado mental y también el método retrospectivo. Señalamos que la política del Kalmyk Taishi con el Estado ruso fue un medio para lograr la estabilidad dentro de la sociedad Kalmyk, un acelerador de la formación del Estado Kalmyk en la región del Volga. La investigación concluye que, entre las muchas razones de la migración de Kalmyks a la región del Volga, se puede destacar la principal: el hecho de que los kalmyks sintieron la necesidad de un espacio territorial para crear su propio Estado soberano.

Palabras clave: Kalmyk Khanate, Estado ruso, Estado Kalmyk, soberanía política, Tratado Shert.

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Introduction

The Kalmyk people are the Mongol people of the Oirat group, who left Dzungaria, their historical homeland, at the beginning of the 17th century, and voluntarily joined the Russian State when they migrated to its borders. They created their own, almost independent statehood called the Kalmyk Khanate in the vast steppes, between the Volga and the Don. Since then, the history of the Kalmyk ethnos and the history of the peoples of multinational Russia have been inextricably linked. This study examines the processes of formation of the Kalmyk statehood, from the time when the Kalmyks were a nomadic tribe to the formation of the Kalmyk Khanate (Chetyrova and Znamensky, 2019). During this growth and development, Kalmykia somehow felt the influence of the Russian state, especially in terms of formation. There was an interaction of forms and methods of traditional state and legal institutions of the Kalmyks with the administrative structures of Russia. In this regard, the process of formation and development of the Kalmyk statehood, which, on one hand, developed based on state structures of the Kalmyk Khanate, and, on the other hand, felt significant influence from the Russian state apparatus, is of considerable interest. It was in this that the development of statehood among the Kalmyk people and its originality manifested itself (Badmaeva, 2018).

The source base is a large range of published historical sources of the XVII-XVIII centuries' archives of the Russian Federation. The theme of the article attracted more critical sources, stored in the collections of the National Archives of the Republic of Kalmykia, the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, the State Archive of the Orenburg Region, and Historical Archive in Omsk Region. The funds of the National Archive of the Republic of Kalmykia contain government decrees and orders, reports, messages from representatives of the local administration, and correspondence between local governing bodies. In the collections of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, we found the Russian Foreign Ministry Documents of Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Military College, Commerce College, and other institutions. Most relevant to our article are the funds "Mongol Affairs", "Kalmyk Affairs", "Zyungur Affairs" and "Kirghiz-Kaisak Affairs" (Gunaev, 2014). The collections of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts contain documents of the Senate that touched on the main issues of relations between the Russian government and the Kalmyk state. This article's research process was guided by the requirements of modern historical science, which includes general philosophical principles (concreteness, historicism, objectivity), as well as historical-comparative and descriptive-analytical methods, including observation, comparison, description, and generalization (Maksimov, 2017). In the discussion of the formation of statehood among the Kalmyks, three stages can be clearly distinguished: Pre-revolutionary, Soviet and post-Soviet (Seok *et al.*, 2021).

Pre-revolutionary researchers include major Russian scientists and others. Researchers of this period have accumulated a huge number of factual materials for the development of the topic under study; the study used materials from such a Soviet scientist as Kichikov (1994). In the post-Soviet period to the study of matter contributed historians and researchers Tepkeev and Sanchirov (2016), and Tsyuryumov and Kyrapov (2019). Despite a large number of research papers, many questions about the history of Kalmyk

statehood are still debatable. Authors such as Bougdaeva and Isaacs (2018), Wu *et al.* (2019), Wang *et al.* (2019), Li *et al.* (2017), Burghardt (2019), Xiaoyan *et al.* (2019), Fossheim (2019), Cinnirella and R. Schueler (2018), Mokyr (2018), Benson (2018), and Johnson and Koyama (2017) also contributed to the research topics.

The aim of this research is to study the unique features of the formation of the Kalmyks, as well as the key aspects of the formation of their ethnic group in close connection with neighboring cultures, as well as to consider their influence on each other.

History of the Kalmyks. The beginning of statehood, territorial struggle and struggle for power: Characteristics

The history of the Volga Kalmyk's statehood, which represented the nomadic civilization of the great steppe as a special political entity in the early 17th century, began with the movement of some Oirat uluses from Central Asia to Western Siberia, where they established their first contacts with the Russians, and then moved to the Volga region in the 30s of the 17th century. The bulk of the settlers was Torghuts. Having settled in a new region, the Kalmyks began to establish close relations with local people—Kazakhs, Bashkirs, Nogais, Russians, etc. The Kalmyks were resettled along the borders of the Russian state. Researchers explain this phenomenon for various reasons. Among the main reasons are pasture insufficiency, and the need for trade relations with urban centers.

However, these reasons are insufficient justification. At one time, S.K. Bogoyavlensky noted in his writings that the Kalmyk owners constantly waged wars for the possession of pasture lands with all neighboring peoples, including the Kazakhs, Bashkirs, Turkmens, and Nogais. He also noted that the feuds among the Oirat owners were often fiercer than with external enemies, for leadership among the taish, the capture of uluses, but never for pasture lands. There was enough pasture for everyone to roam. So, the Kalmyks tried to return the fled Nogais' and include them in their uluses (Salaev *et al.*, 2018).

The Nogai clans agreed to roam together under the rule of the Kalmyks who captured them. Such relations are characteristic of international relations in pre-industrial societies, regardless of whether the peoples are sedentary or nomadic. New territories were conquered not in order to displace local peoples, but primarily to include them in their state, to force them to recognize their power and collect taxes from them, to increase their status by increasing the number of uluses, since in a nomadic environment, the rank of the ruler is determined primarily not by the land area, but by the number of the subject population. The larger the number of people in the uluses, the more you can collect tribute, put more soldiers, etc.

The main cause of the Kalmyk-Bashkir conflicts in the 20-30s of the XVII century were pasture lands along the Tobol and Yaik rivers. It is worth noting here that the Kalmyk taish did not seek to expel the Bashkirs from these lands, even trying to include them in their uluses. In addition, the Kalmyk uluses included some families of Nogais and Yedisans, who left the Kalmyk people and migrated from them to the Kuban only at

the end of the first quarter of the XVIII century. However, in 1645, the Oirat rulers persistently asked the Kalmyk rulers to return to Dzungaria. Thus, it can be concluded that the main reason for the migration of Kalmyks from Central Asia to the Volga region was not land crowding. The main reason for the desire of the Kalmyk uluses' owners to occupy territories that were part of the zone of influence of Russia was the desire to form their own state. Kalmyk rulers repeatedly gave allegiance to the Russian state. These agreements formed the basis of military-political cooperation between the parties. However, the Kalmyk Taishi often violated the contract. Breach of contract on the part of the Kalmyk caused distrust. So openly stated in an interview with the ambassadors of Taishas' Daichin and Yelden in the summer of 1645 the Duma clerk of the Embassy order Grigory Lvov: "And go ahead and make them believe that they are sacrificing, but they do not stand on their truth."

In reality, the Kalmyk rulers were quite far-sighted and prudent in their foreign policy. The Kalmyks' dependence on Russia was illusory. The Russian state at that time could not yet control the political situation in the Volga region. Realizing this, the Kalmyk Taishi resumed negotiations after each violation of the Treaty, since they could acquire status and recognition in international relations by such methods. The fact that the shert was violated made it necessary to resume negotiations, where the Kalmyk Taish had to be recognized as independent political subjects of international relations. Thus, it can be said that the Russian government did not have absolute power over the Kalmyks. The shert agreements of the mid-17th century of the Kalmyk ulus lords with the Russian state looks like agreements of equal-status political subjects of international law.

After the death of Kho-Urlyuk in 1644, a power struggle began among his sons. This led to a new aspect in the development of Kalmyk-Russian relations and the formation of Kalmyk statehood. The Volga Kalmyks did not have a clear tradition of inheriting power. Ho-Urlyuk himself did not appoint any of his sons as the heir: "Torguts' Kho-Urlyuk, dividing among the six sons 1.000 carriages and said to them 'who is good, that there is no need—how much do little if the people. Children! you know whether to be good or bad.'" In the autumn of 1643, the Kalmyks organized a campaign with the intention of annexing the remaining Nogai. The main forces under the command of Kho-Urlyuk himself and his son Kirsan went deep into the Caucasus. In January 1644, the combined forces of Nogai, Kabardian and Circassian detachments defeated the Kalmyk troops. Kho-Urlyuk and Kirsan were killed in the battle (Kichikov, 1994).

The eldest of Kho-Urlyuk's sons was Daichin, who at this time was making a pilgrimage to Tibet. The second oldest of the sons was Shunkei. He actively participated in the political life of the Kalmyks and always played secondary roles, but after 1646 his name is no longer mentioned in historical documents of that time. Kho-Urlyuk's third son was Yelden, who migrated to Dzungaria in 1646 (Kichikov, 1994). The next oldest was Sanjin, who didn't show much and was always in the background. Since 1657, the shert records do not mention his name. Most likely, he, too, like Yelden, migrated to Dzungaria. The struggle for ownership of the Kalmyk ulus began after the return of Daichin from Tibet. Many Kalmyk Taishi made a pilgrimage to Tibet (Tsyuryumov and Kyrapov, 2019). Buddhism has become widespread among the Mongol people (Kitinov, 2018). Daichin's rival was his brother Lauzan; in 1656, this struggle turned into a real internecine war.

In 1658, Daichin organized a pogrom in the ulus of Lauzan and forced it to migrate to the East of Yaik. Lauzan tried to win back and the next year he attacked the ulus of Daichin but was defeated. He had to flee to Western Siberia. Here he was attacked from holodnogo Ablai Taishi, and roamed in the Baraba steppe. Lauzan died. The people under his control returned to the Volga region to Daichin.

Periods of increased confrontation between the Kalmyks and the Russians weakened Daichin's position and brought Lauzan to the main role. Lauzan was a strong supporter of the hard-line toward the Russian state. There are several reasons for this. First, it was Lauzan who played a major role in the capture of the Volga region. According to Gaban Sharab and the author of the anonymous story *History of the Kalmyk Khans*, Lauzan was the first to move to the Western side when the Kho-Urlyuk and Daichin's headquarters were located on the Eastern Bank of the Yaik river, and together with his brother Yelden, subdued the Nogai people who lived here (Seok *et al.*, 2020). Secondly, Lauzan was one of the main leaders in the military campaign of the winter of 1643-1644. In 1645, Lauzan's name is mentioned first when listing his brothers Yelden, Shunkei, Sanjin, and his nephew Nama-Seren in connection with their plans to migrate to Dzungaria. In 1646, Lauzan was the main culprit for the breakdown of negotiations with Alfery Kudryavtsev, who arrived in the Kalmyk uluses from Moscow, and was tasked with normalizing Kalmyk-Russian relations (Kichikov, 1994; Martinkovic, 2021). Thus, Lauzan in the eyes of the Kalmyks was the culprit of the military campaign of the winter of 1643-1644, as well as the culprit of the deterioration of relations with the people of Volga region.

Daichin's cooperation with the Russian Empire and the signing of the shert agreement: Features

The strengthening of Daichin's position is primarily due to several factors. First, in order to weaken the leading position among the brothers, under the pretext of a pilgrimage to Tibet, he was suspended from a military campaign that was supposed to be successful for the other sons of Kho-Urlyuk. However, his suspension from the campaign of the winter of 1643-1644 relieved him of responsibility for its defeat. Second, it has more advantages in the negotiation processes for establishing good-neighborly relations with the people of the region, and first of all with the Russians. Thus, after the death of Kho-Urlyuk, Daichin became the first Taisha.

Daichin managed to stabilize the internal political situation of the Kalmyk uluses; in the early 50s of the XVII century made a second pilgrimage to Tibet, and also held talks with other rulers of the Oirats of Central Asia regarding the foreign policy of the Volga Kalmyks and the possibility of concluding a military-political alliance with the Erden-Batur Huntaiji to advance the Kalmyks to the West. So, in 1654, the Bashkir interpreter V. Kerzhatsky, who returned from the Kalmyk uluses, which were located two days away from the left Bank of the Yaik and a few days away from Ufa, informed that "he hears from samovo Monchak-Taisha and his uluses' people that in the current springtime with his father Monchak with Daichin Taisha will be to them distant Kalmyk people Batyr-Huntaiji Karakulin with many of his Kalmyk military men. But at what time they will come and what their arrival will be, it is not known." However, in the

winter of 1654, Monchak himself reported to Astrakhan that “the father of Monchak, Daichin Taisha in the current winter time from distant Kalmyk uluses from Siberian places sent his people thirty people, and with them ordered that he, Monchak Taisha, with your sovereign Astrakhan people be in peace, and do not fix wars and fervor in anything” (Preobrazhenskaya, 1960). Most likely, Daichin’s plans to support the ruler of Dzungaria did not materialize, and military campaigns had to be abandoned. At this time, the Astrakhan administration received a decree by A.M. Romanov on bringing the Kalmyk’s Taishas to the shert agreement. In winter, an interpreter, Afanasy Borisov, was sent from Astrakhan to Monchak, who was received with hostility by the Kalmyk Taishi. The messenger was accused of being sent “for deception, not with the truth”: he was tortured (captured, tied up, breaking his arm), robbed “naked” and sent to distant uluses. After that, the Kalmyks began raiding Russian settlements. This situation continued until the arrival of Daichin from Dzungaria. In December, in Astrakhan arrived the messenger from Daichin, who was able to clarify the situation that “bad things happened” due to the lack of the ulus Daichin raids and what—not the work of the Kalmyks, a nomadic with them Tatars, the Kalmyks ready to give wool and exchanged prisoners (Preobrazhenskaya, 1960).

Daichin managed to convince the Astrakhan administration that the Kalmyks were ready to conclude peace and live in good neighborly relations with the Russians. His position was the exact opposite of that held by his younger brother Lauzan, who, in the absence of Daichin, held primacy in the hierarchy of the Kalmyk’s Taishas. Thus, it can be stated that the crises occurred during the absence of Daichin in the Kalmyk uluses. And in all cases, the initiatives of peaceful relations came from Daichin. Lauzan violated the shert agreements, and he used inappropriate treatment of Russian envoys. In reality, the problems of external relations of the Kalmyks in these situations were of no small importance, domestic political issues came to the fore, specifically: whether Daichin would be able to retain the status of the leading Taisha, or whether Lauzan would still take the lead. More successful was the pragmatic Daichin.

On February 4, 1655, a written shert agreement was issued, which contained specific obligations, and the vassal status of the Volga Kalmyks to Russia was fixed. These shert agreements were signed by Daichin, and his younger brothers Lauzan and Sanjin. Then, the sons of Daichin Monchak and Nama-Seren. In the spring of 1657 signed a new contract with cherty tasami the Monchak and Manicom, which states:

We are Kalmyk Taisha: I, Monchak Taisha for myself and for the father of my native Daichin Taisha, Urlyukov, and I, Manjik Taisha, Dayan Erkin son, for the grandfather of my native Daichin Taisha... on the fact that Daichin Taisha and us, Monchak and Manjik Taishas with brothers and children and with nephews, and our Kalmyk uluses’ people the great sovereign Tsar in... obedience and good to him want in everything really without any antics and tricks. (Preobrazhenskaya, 1960)

Lauzan and Sanjin are no longer listed. Most likely, for Lauzan and Yelden, such a price for power was too much. They were organically unable to cross the steppe traditions and fought for their observance until the last opportunity, taking up arms against their brother. On the other hand, they seemed to understand that Daichin's superiority lay precisely in his ability to transcend traditional boundaries, and that he could not be suspected of treachery, apostasy, or primitive compromise.

The path that Daichin chose was more correct. He probably returned from Dzungaria, where a long internecine war had begun after the death of Erden-Batur-Khuntaiji in 1654, with the firm conviction that the Volga's Kalmyks would not be able to count on Dzungaria's help in the event of a war with the Russians. In addition, Daichin perfectly imagined what a long internecine war between the brothers could turn out for the entire Kalmyk ulus. The situation is similar in Dzungaria. In these circumstances, Daichin was forced to break the established traditions. All this has led to positive results for the Kalmyks. They were granted the right to roam on both sides of the Volga, and the conditions of trade relations with the Russians were improved. Accepting obligations to the Russian state was not an easy decision for Daichin. So, in 1657, it was not Daichin himself who dictated, but his son and grandson on his behalf. During the negotiations in 1661 on the new shert, Daichin suggested that the Russian Ambassador I.S. Gorokhov should work out the final decision on the content and design of the shert agreement with Monchak, because he, Daichin, was "in old age" (Preobrazhenskaya, 1960).

V.I. Kolesnik wrote in his work:

At the same time, successfully implementing another scheme, questions inevitably arose about the division of power between father and son. Daichin was able to anticipate the problems that might arise in his relationship with Monchak after the victory over Lauzan. To neutralize the ambitions of his son, he brought his grandson to the political stage. By dividing some of the power between them, Daichin made sure that they would not become dangerous to him if they united. Therefore, he chose Manjik, the son of Dayan-Erke, who died in 1646, rather than Ayuka, the son of Monchak. The calculation of the confrontation between uncle and nephew was only partially correct: their forces were clearly unequal. Daichin realized in a timely manner that it would be a mistake to remove oneself from the scherting. (Toropitsyn et al., 2019)

Therefore, in the summer of 1661, the shert agreement begins with the words: "Se az Daichin Taisha Urlyuk Taisha's son, da yaz Monchak Taisha Daichin Taisha's son, making a faithful contract, we give shert to the Great Sovereign." However, it was too late. In December of the same year, Monchak single-handedly dictated to the Russian Tsar: "I am giving a wool... Kalmyk's Bunchuk Taisha for myself and for my father Daichin Taisha of Urlyuks, and for my nephew Monjik Yalba Taisha, and for other Taisha, and for my Kalmyk uluses related sovereign people who roam with us, and for Nogais, and for Edisans, and for Enbulak, and for Malisbash, and for Kelechin Murz, and for their children, and brothers, and nephews, and for granddaughters, and for their ulus people." Thus, it can be concluded that Monchak concentrated all contacts with

the Russian state, ousting his father and his most dangerous nephew from foreign policy relations. In order not to lose his position, Daichin decided to move to the positions that his brother Lauzan had recently occupied. This was to a certain extent justified in terms of the formation of statehood among the Kalmyks.

Features that provoked the conflict between the Kalmyks and the Russian Empire: The reasons for the Bashkir uprising

The concentration of Supreme power in the hands of Daichin, his son and grandson, that is the creation of a dynasty with the inheritance of power in a direct descending line (for which, in fact, all the concessions to the Russian state were necessary at the conclusion of the shert) as the main condition for the state consolidation of the Kalmyk ulus was achieved. Accordingly, it became possible to restore the status of sovereignty and successfully compete with neighboring nations for a dominant role in the Volga region. Daichin decided to try to use this chance. However, the effective implementation of this political line was hindered by the position of Monchak, who was in a hurry to fully inherit the power of Daichin, and for this purpose from now on had to focus on closer and closer rapprochement with the Russian state.

In the winter of 1661-1662, immediately after the adoption of the last shert Treaty, Taisha Manjik consistently and significantly attacked the Tersk town and the surrounding area of Astrakhan. Monchak reacted to this no less demonstratively—he seized the uluses of his nephew, captured him, and gave him to the Russian authorities. This was the first time that the Kalmyk rulers got rid of their rival relatives in the power struggle. Daichin decided to use this circumstance to strengthen his precarious position. He demanded the immediate release of his nephew from the Russian authorities, otherwise threatening war. Thus, one can say that once again there was a split among the Kalmyk political elite. The Russian authorities left Daichin's demand to release his nephew unanswered. Then he decided to go against the Russian authorities and take part in the Bashkir uprising of 1662-1664. Daichin's participation in the uprising A.P Chuloshnikov described it as follows:

Already in 1662, when the movement emerged from its initial preparatory stage, it outlined two organizing centers: on the one hand, in the person of the heirs of the former Siberian Khan Kuchum, his grandsons' sultans Kuchuk and Abugai, on the other—in the person of the Kalmyk Taishis Daichin, and Ayuka (the eldest son of Monchak), who tried to use the moment to renew their long-standing rivalry with the Moscow state for the possession of Bashkiria. And subsequently, during the entire course of the uprising, the connection between the two directions was never interrupted. (Cinnirella and Schueler, 2018)

The rebellion was defeated. However, Daichin managed to bounce back from the rebels in time, repented to the Russian government, was forgiven, and migrated with the subordinate ulus to Yaik, where he was practically independent of his son and the Russian authorities.

Monchak participated in the Bashkir uprising, on the side of Russia. In the summer of 1664, he was officially recognized by the Tsarist authorities as the Supreme ruler of the Kalmyk ulus and endowed with the appropriate symbols of power: the Mace and banner (Kichikov, 1994). Although the bulk of the Kalmyks was controlled by Monchak, he was never able to achieve recognition of his Supreme authority over all Kalmyk ulus. He constantly defended his right to rule over the Kalmyks' Taisha and worked too closely with the authorities of the Moscow state, which he could not do without. Russian authorities were even asked to build fortresses and garrison them with Russian military men on the Eastern Bank of the Yaik to protect them "from the arrival of the great sovereign's distant Kalmyk people near the cities and Kalmyk ulus." In 1669, during some war with the distant Oirats, he died.

Ayuka, the son of Monchak, had to fight for power with Taisha's relatives, who did not recognize his primacy for the status of Supreme Taisha. So the Kalmyk Taisha Dugar and Bok went to the don and from here in 1670 attacked the Ayuka ulus. Gaban Sharab mentions that: "Ayuka Khan Solom Tseren and Taiju Baatur (Taisha Bagatyr, Ayuka's Great—uncle, son of Shunkey—V.K.), who wanted to catch him, forgave them" (Fossheim, 2019). Nevertheless, in Tsagan-Sar in 1672, Dugar and other torgut's Taishas, as well as the Taisha of the Volga derbets Solom-Seren, helped Ayuka defeat the khoshout Taisha Ablai and return the uluses and nomads that Ablai had taken from Daichin shortly before, and thereby establish himself in the status of the first Taisha. Ayuka's relatives showed a very high degree of internal political consolidation of the Volga Kalmyks and found the strength to suppress their personal ambitions in to preserve the integrity of the unified Kalmyk uluses. After these events, as noted in historical documents, "Ayuka Khan destroyed his own uncle Dugar, who brought him the ulus and made him Khan." Moreover, Dugar, as well as the captured Ablai, Ayuka handed over to the Russian authorities, coinciding with the state interests demanded rapprochement with Russia. Contemporaries understood the inevitability of such a foreign policy orientation. "Dugar said (to his nephew) Ayuka Khan: "If my actions are infallible, then you, Ayuka, for whatever reason, will definitely go to Russia." Those words came true (when Ayuka Khan accepted Russian citizenship). The dominant Taisha of the Volga Kalmyks, Ayuka, claimed allegiance to the Russian state in 1673, 1677, 1681, 1683, and 1684 years, much more than any of its previous owners of the Kalmyk ulus. For a long time, his sovereignty as a ruler rapidly increased and reached its highest point in 1690, when the Supreme person of the Lamaist Church, the Dalai Lama from Lhasa, sent Ayuka a Diploma for the title of Khan and symbols of Khan power (Tepkeev and Sanchirov, 2016). Thus, the real status of Ayuka as a sovereign state received the highest title in the Mongol world, and the Kalmyk khanate appeared on the political map of Eurasia.

Conclusions

The Kalmyks' relations with the Russian state remained as relations of two equal political partners. The Kalmyk khanate was only verbally subordinate to the Russian state, but in reality, it was independent. The rulers of the Kalmyk khanate effectively sought recognition of their political sovereignty in international relations. In the summer of

1697, in “the Treaty articles committed on the Kamyshenka river, between the Kalmyk Khan Ayuk and the Boyar Prince Boris Golitsyn. About providing him with firearms from the Russian state in the event of a campaign against Bukhara, Karakalpaks and Kirgizes, about free nomadism for him in all Russian villages, about helping him in the event of an attack on him by Crimeans, about a fine for baptizing Kalmyks without a special decree, and about protecting the Khan from the Donets and Bashkirs.” The final paragraph of the document is also significant: “the Boyar Prince Boris Alexandrovich, with the Kalmyk Ayuka, with his son and with all his best people, such white letters were exchanged.”

Thus, it is clear that the Kalmyks, who migrated to the Volga region in the 30s of the XVII century, actively entered into political relations with the local peoples of this region and, above all, with the Russian state. The policy of the Kalmyk taish with the Russian state was a means of ensuring stability within the Kalmyk society, and an accelerator for the formation of Kalmyk statehood in the Volga region. During the second half of the 17th century, the status of the Kalmyk Taishas as sovereign rulers increased and reached its highest point in 1690, when Ayuka received from the head of the Lamai clergy, the Dalai Lama, a Diploma for the title of Khan and symbols of the Supreme ruler. Among the many reasons for the migration of Kalmyks to the Volga region, one can distinguish the main one. It consisted in the fact that the Kalmyks felt the need for territorial space to create their own state. The loss of political sovereignty by the Kalmyk khanate led to the migration of the Kalmyks to Dzungaria in 1771.

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